To understand how it was possible for the Germans (with Hitler) at the end of 1944 to organize such a counteroffensive and actually implement it, it is necessary to dwell briefly on the situation in the Allied camp.
Under pressure from Joseph Stalin, who had long been calling for the opening of a second front, the Allies landed in Normandy in northern France in June 1944. The advance was relatively fast and decisive: the August 25, Paris was liberated, while in the battle of the pocket of Falaise, the retreating Germans left 10.000 dead and at least 50.000 prisoners. Meanwhile, the allies have also landed in the south.
The "winner syndrome": the situation of the Allies against Hitler
At the end of the summer, France was free. Carried away by victory euphoriaIn September, the Anglo-Americans (to which considerable Canadian, French and Polish contingents must be added) launch a reckless offensive with airborne troops in Holland, beyond the mouth of the Rhine (Operation Market Garden), but the attack is resolved in a stalemate and heavy losses.
The Germans fall back efficiently and hold throughout. western wall, a fortified line stretching from the Netherlands to Switzerland. The fast moving war soon turns into a war of attrition, not unlike the one fought, again between the Americans and Germans, between 1917 and 1918. The front lines and battle sites, ironically, are the same.
When autumn comes the various breakout attempts, made by the allies, break against the resistance of the Wehrmacht and the effects of numerous losses begin to be felt: in the hurtgen forest, scene of very hard battles, for example, the Americans will eventually lose more than 30.000 men. In December, as the first snows begin to fall, it is now clear that, contrary to what many anti-Hitler Allied officers expected and predicted, the war will not end at christmas.
The allies against Hitler are confident
Nonetheless, the allies are firmly convinced that they are now one step away from victory and they feed this conviction with an excess of pride and a certain arrogance, dictated by the clear superiority in terms of men, means and resources at their disposal.
It is precisely this poorly concealed sense of security that leads the Allies to underestimate the intentions of the enemy and not from any enemy: Adolf Hitler is on the ropes, it is true, but a boxer in the corner is even more formidable, since he is willing to play everything for everything. Germany also, despite the difficulties, in 1944 still has a formidable war potential.
The German movements at the end of November, although they do not go completely unnoticed, are nevertheless declassified by the head of the intelligence ally, Major General Kenneth Strong, as simple defensive maneuvers. However, Strong is not the only one responsible. LThe vast majority of British and American officers believe they have such mastery over the current campaign that they do not even consider the possibility of a German counteroffensive..
Military Issues: For or Against Hitler?
To these strategic observations, we must add more strictly military issues. First of all, we must take into account the difficulty for the allied logistics machinery to supply a vast and highly specialized army, in need of a large amount of food, comfort items, ammunition, motorized means, spare parts.
Without a massive cover of artillery and armored units, the Americans do not attack, the British (who occupy the northern sector, in Holland) remain even more inactive and do not advance. The conquest of Antwerp, with its great port, undoubtedly helped to partially solve the problem., but failed to restore the momentum to the offensive against Germany. Therefore, there is a real need to stop, at least for the winter, to reorganize and replenish forces for the final offensive.
Then there is the human factor to take into account: the bulk of allied troops have been continuously at the front since June and many departments are in disastrous condition. A replacement would be necessary, but American units arriving in Europe are made up of young recruits, still inexperienced, while the British, already at war for five years, have to scrape the bottom of the barrel.
In bad weather…bad face
Bad weather further damages morale. First rain, then snow and frost, make trenches and holes uninhabitable. In addition, bad weather conditions prevent vehicles, stuck in the mud, move quickly, not to mention the fog that forces RAF and USAF fighters and bombers, whose weight in combat is crucial, to the ground.
On November 11, General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, wrote to General Marshall from the relative comfort of his headquarters: » Dear general, I'm getting more and more tired of this rain «.
Imagine then how the soldiers can get by in the muddy pits: soaked to the core, without dry clothing for weeks. trench foot, a disabling condition made worse by poor sanitation, is now endemic, as is dysentery. With winter, the dead (or those who will lose a limb) by freezing will be numerous. These conditions are obviously also common among German soldiers, who, in fact, fare much worse in terms of food, housing, and clothing.
In mid-December, completely oblivious to the impending German action, bernard montgomery, commander of the British and Canadian forces, and Eisenhower They have a curious exchange of letters in which the British general reminds his American superior of the bet he made some time ago about ending the war by Christmas. Montgomery encloses a five-pound note with his letter, but "Ike" responds angrily:
"I still have nine days, and although it seems almost certain that you will have another five pounds by Christmas, it is certain that you will not have them before that day."
Eisenhower and Monty
Relations between Eisenhower and "Monty" and between the latter and the other US generals are not really the best. In general, the British and the Americans, although in generally serene weather, are no strangers to mutual feuds and grudges.
Already resigned to the idea of resuming the offensive after the 1944 vacation, the Allies began to prepare their armies at the points of easiest access to Germany. In the Ardennes, an impervious region, made up of dense and almost impenetrable forests, only The US 1st Army, commanded by General Courtney Hodges, and made up of retired or newly established units. On the other hand, it is impossible to think of further progress in this sector.
For the Allied high command it is better to focus on Cologne, further north, and the Ruhr region, further south, and it is in these two lines that they concentrate the bulk of their forces.. Furthermore, they think, if the Germans ever counter-attacked, they would do so on the aforementioned line and certainly not in the Ardennes area: firstly, it would be useless, secondly, it would involve such an effort that it would certainly not go unnoticed.
never underestimate the enemy
In essence, the Allies against Hitler repeated the same mistake that cost them dearly in May 1940. Underestimating the Germans and underestimating the Ardennes sector itself, where four years earlier the Wehrmacht's armored divisions had plunged like a knife into the butter.
Throughout the fall, Hodges's 1st Army intelligence services ignored all signs of an impending offensive. Many Germans captured in those weeks, when questioned, speak of a major attack planned before Christmas, but this information is dismissed as mere Alarmism. To make the situation even more confusing, there is the aforementioned Operation Griffin, carried out by German soldiers disguised as Americans.
Too busy chasing down the saboteurs, supposedly non-existent commandos sent behind the lines by the Germans to kill Eisenhower, US intelligence and officials lose sight of what is really happening: the risk of real disaster lies behind the corner.
Battle of the Ardennes ”: the gap in Hitler's allied front
When evening falls December 15th 1944, the Ardennes sector is the calmest sector of the entire front. The night is freezing. The trees and the roofs of the Belgian villages are covered by a thick layer of snow. The woods are unusually quiet. It's the calm before the storm.
In the early morning of December 16, 1944, a heavy artillery barrage preceded the advance of German troops along a front of almost 100 km.. Meanwhile, the American officers, Hodges and General Bradley (sector commander), are sleeping easy: they believe that this is a simple defensive bombardment, not a full-blown attack.
The German plan provides for progress in three directions: towards the north, 6th SS Armored Army of the General 'Sepp' Dietrich entrusted with the main task, namely, to break through the American lines and quickly aim at the Meuse, crossing it at Liège and from there turning north to Antwerp. with 4 armored divisions of the Waffen-SS and five other infantry, Dietrich faces the US 99th Infantry Division, deployed along a 30 km front: too much for a single unit.
when you are caught by surprise
Caught by surprise, insufficient (with nearly a thousand casualties since November), and made up of officers and conscripts, the 99th, reinforced by the remainder of General Gerow's V Corps from the north, unexpectedly put up fierce resistance to the attackers. German. Enough to slow progress and prevent a breakthrough in a crucial sector. For the SS, considered the elite of the German army, it is a very hard blow. Already on December 20, disappointed by his best units, Hitler transferred the main role of the operation to Manteuffel's army, deployed in the center.
About this sector, located in the Schnee Eifel region (a series of snowy valleys, covered by a dense forest), defended by the 106th division and the XNUMXth cavalry group, fell the General Hasso von Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army, which managed to break through and penetrate deep. The American units are overwhelmed and fall back, but fight hard, while the Germans also lose many men:
“German losses were catastrophic. The German infantry was advancing, marching in the middle of the road without armored support. The German soldiers could barely march or shoot and knew nothing of infantry tactics. The Volksgrenadier divisions were not capable of effective action. However, they found themselves attacking the trained eighteen-year-old Americans as best they could.”
Hitler's Huge Battles
Manteuffel's target is the key road junctions of St. Vith and Bastogne. The battle is immediately intense. On the right flank, four German divisions surround two regiments of the US 106th Division, capturing more than 8.000 soldiers, in what the Americans themselves recognize as the greatest defeat suffered in the European theater during World War II. On the other hand, on the left flank, the LVII Panzer Corps crosses the Our River and heads for Houffalize, in the direction of the Meuse, while still further south, XLVII Panzer Corps heads towards Bastogne.
On third and last sector of the offensive, the south, was deployed instead the General Brandenberger's 7th Army, with the task of covering Manteuffel's left flank. After crossing the Our River, German infantry divisions advance a few kilometers and soon encounter heavy resistance from the US 9th Armored Division and 4th Infantry Division. Already on December 19, the attack in this sector was inevitably compromised: Of In fact, General George Patton's 3rd Army was coming in from the south, sent to close the gap in the Ardennes.
Meanwhile, on December 17, with the American units still in a state of panic, the 1st SS Armored Division launched into the breach opened by the enemy. More than 20.000 men and 250 strong tanks, including many Tiger i y IIThey led the raid from the column of Lieutenant Colonel Joachim Peiper. The latter, who personally commands almost 100 tanks, plans to reach Huy unmolested and from there cross the Meuse, but with 70 km to go, near Stavelot, American reinforcements manage to blockade and isolate it.
Peiper's crimes
Peiper's SS, on their march to the Meuse, will be guilty of numerous crimes against the American prisoners and against the Belgian civilians, but they will not succeed in their attempt to reach the Meuse: without fuel, they abandoned the armored vehicles, within December 26 Peiper and his men will be forced to withdraw on foot.
Thus, the first days of the offensive marked partial tactical success for the Germans.: in addition to Peiper's breakthrough, especially in the center, the advance continued and the Americans withdrew in great confusion. However, unlike what happened in 1940, when the French surrendered without resistance to the German Blitzkrieg ("blitzkrieg"), this time the numbers and time played in favor of the Allies.
Already on December 17, more than 10.000 trucks transport more than 60.000 men in the Ardennes and in a week Eisenhower manages to bring more than 250.000 soldiers to the theater of operations. Furthermore, as is widely estimated by many officers, von Rundstedt and Model above all, the Germans do not have sufficient resources to carry out their offensive effort, which is therefore bound to run aground. However, Hitler didn't give up, and neither did many soldiers. The Führer's order was simply "advance, advance, advance."